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With so many others, I am in deep, appreciative, and enthusiastic support 
of the proposals and search for a global ethic that Hans Kung and Leonard 
Swidler have been advancing over the past years (Kung 1991; Swidler 
1992). The "Declaration of a Global Ethic" that was approved by 250 reli- 
gious leaders at the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago on 4 Septem- 
ber 1993 (Kung and Kuschel 1993) represents a goal that all peoples and 
all religions must resolutely move toward if they are to exercise "global re- 
sponsibility" in resolving the crises that face our planet as it enters the 
twenty-first century. (For a careful but sobering description and analysis of 
these multiple crises, see Kennedy [1993].) 
The critical remarks that follow are meant, in the fullest sense, to be a 
positive criticism-a support that will enable Kung, Swidler, and all of us to 
achieve this necessary goal of a global ethic that will ground a global 
responsibility. I fear that, unless the warnings and directions that I am sug- 
gesting are taken to heart, the path that Kung and Swidler are walking can 
either turn into a dead-end or, contrary to their intentions, lead to an end 
they are trying to avoid. 
In order to achieve a global ethic, Kung and Swidler propose an open- 
ended, pluralistic dialogue among all the religions and ideologies of the 
world. They endorse a genuinely pluralistic approach to elaborating this 
ethic. While I certainly agree that such pluralistic dialogue is indispensable 
for the formulation and acceptance of a global ethic, I want to add that 
indispensable to the success of such a dialogue is a clear recognition that 
this kind of pluralistic dialogue is as dangerous as it is necessary. To suc- 
ceed in their proposal, Kung and Swidler must be aware of these dangers. 
I fear that they are not. 
PITFALLS: THE DANGERS OF DOMINATION 
The dangers of a pluralistic dialogue toward a global ethic are pointed out 
by the critics who do a political-economic analysis of the world and of the 
political structures and agenda that influence all our knowing and all our 
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academic as well as religious pursuits. Their central critique focuses on 
how easily a pluralistic dialogue that calls for the contributions of everyone 
can be, or has been, co-opted and used by the dominant power holders of 
the world in order to maintain their control. The trite but telling image used 
by one of these critics is the McDonald's hamburger. Although the "Big 
Mac" has served as a symbol of growing universality, literally present to 
and embracing all cultures, it is also, in the view of many, a manifestation 
of, and a delicious distraction from, an economic system that dominates 
and exploits the world. In the same way, the call to formulate a global 
ethics through pluralistic dialogue may appear as a noble affirmation of 
universality when, really, it is an instrument of the dominant economic 
power blocs. Kenneth Surin minces no words in unpacking the hamburger 
symbol: 
The McDonald's hamburger is the first universal food, but the people 
-be they from LaPaz, Bombay, Cairo, or Brisbane-who eat the 
McDonald's hamburger also consume the American way of life with 
it. Equally, the adherents of the world ecumenism canvassed by the 
religious pluralists align themselves with a movement that is univer- 
sal, but they too consume a certain way of life.... To resist the cul- 
tural encroachment represented by the McDonald's hamburger, there- 
fore, is of a piece with resisting the similar depredation constituted by 
the world ecumenism [i.e., by calls for global agreements on ethics]. 
(Surin 1989, p. 201) 
The reason why Surin and others warn that calls for a pluralistic dialogue 
can be turned into "depredation" has to do with what we can term the 
political or ideological nature and intent of all language. Put simply, our 
language and our truth claims are not only culturally conditioned, but they 
are also economically and politically conditioned. They are rooted in our 
political or economic position in society and in our desire either to main- 
tain that position or to better it. Our interpretations and our language, 
therefore, do not simply limit our own grasp of truth; they can also oppress 
the ability of others to assert and live their own truths. Language is not only 
limiting; it is also self-serving of one group and oppressive of others. David 
Tracy has taken these admonitions seriously: "Every discourse bears within 
itself the anonymous and repressed actuality of highly particular arrange- 
ments of power and knowledge. Every discourse, by operating under cer- 
tain assumptions, necessarily excludes other assumptions. Above all, our 
discourses exclude those others who might disrupt the established hierar- 
chies or challenge the prevailing hegemony of power" (1987, p. 79). 
We might easily miss the deeper, all-pervasive content of what is here 
being recognized about language and interpretation. What we did not face 
in the immediate past (modernity) and what has become frighteningly clear 
today (one of the postmodern insights) is that such exclusion of others, 
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such power-serving and self-serving acts, are not just an occasional "mis- 
use" of language that can be removed much as one clears one's throat. 
Rather, we are speaking about "systemic distortions," pervasive tendencies 
within all use of language-a disease in our vocal cords! We cannot inter- 
pret and we cannot speak without hearing-and often responding to-the 
siren call of ideology, the inclination to use our "truth" for our own power 
or dominance: "Ideologies are unconscious but systemically functioning 
attitudes, values, and beliefs produced by and in the material conditions of 
all uses of language, all analyses of truth, and all claims to knowledge.... 
Ideologies are carried in and by the very language we use to know any 
reality at all" (Tracy 1987, p. 77). Thus, to understand the words that others, 
or we ourselves, are using, we have to ask questions about the ideologies 
that lurk within our language, ideologies that are rooted in our sociopoliti- 
cal situatedness. I do not hear either Kung or Swidler asking those kind of 
questions. 
Michael Foucault helps us appreciate more profoundly this political 
nature of language. We do not have to agree with him fully in order to 
learn from him. His basic claim is that truth is tied to power-that what 
society holds up to be normal or sane or good or noble is determined not 
by any objective pursuit of truth but rather by the power structures in the 
given society (Foucault 1980; Rabinow 1984). Toward the end of his life, 
Foucault seems to have modified his claims and admitted that knowledge 
and power cannot be equivalent (see Placher 1989, p. 103; cf. Foucault 
1984, p. 18); still, his central insight remains: we are always playing with 
power when we are making assertions about what is really true, praisewor- 
thy, beneficial for all members of society. If we do not sufficiently take this 
into account, we can so easily turn what is truth for us into power and con- 
trol over others. 
And this is the warning that critics raise of programs for dialogue such as 
Kung and Swidler propose-that, because they are not sufficiently aware 
how all truth claims are political and "powerful," their program for a plural- 
istic dialogue toward a global ethic can become, whether they are aware of 
it or not, oppressive of others. This process of oppression works basically 
the same way it does in what is called civil discourse within or between 
nations; in fact, interreligious dialogue can all too easily be sucked into and 
made part of the oppression and manipulation that so often hides beneath 
the cloak of civil discourse. Behind all the pretty, inspiring words about the 
beauty of democracy and plurality, the necessity of dialogue, the value of 
everyone's voice, there is a process or program that sets the agenda in 
order to control, mollify, dilute, anyone whose voice might upset the status 
quo. Within the dialogue or civil discourse, the people in power remain in 
control. A traditional proverb makes the same point: "'Every man for him- 
self and God for all' said the elephant as he danced among the chickens" 
(Lindsey 1992, p. 50). 
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Theologians like Kung and Swidler often seem to think that there is 
something like Adam Smith's "magic hand" guiding their calls for open- 
ended, all-inclusive dialogue and assuring that its results will benefit all; 
to forget the ever-intruding realities of economic, national, class, gender, 
and racial interests is as naive and dangerous within the interreligious dia- 
logue as it is within the capitalist (or socialist) system: "Modernity contains 
demonic forces operating under the name of freedom; in the name of free 
discourse and pluralism, these forces may operate to impose a consensus 
that is actually domination of the many by the few" (Lindsey 1992, p. 67). 
Therefore one must be aware, as First World theologians generally are 
not, that, whenever the language of civil discourse and religious dialogue 
comes forth from those who are in political or economic power, such lan- 
guage can all too easily be a ploy to maintain the structures of power. The 
discourse becomes "managerial"-it manages what will be discussed, the 
method for discussion, and the goals of the discussion; what does not fit 
these determinations is judged, in the political discourse, as a disruptive 
"interest group"; in the religious dialogue it might be called a closed or 
primitive or fundamentalist or polytheistic or feminist perspective. 
Critics of literary theory help give voice and substance to these political 
warnings that all proponents of dialogue must take seriously. One might 
substitute interreligious dialogue for the last two words in the subtitle of 
Ellen Rooney's book Seductive Reasoning: Pluralism as Problematic of 
Contemporary Literary Theory. She reveals how "pluralism is the method 
employed by the central authorities to neutralize opposition by seeming to 
accept it" (Rooney 1989, p. 242). The strategy of pluralism, Rooney ex- 
plains, is to exclude such interests as gender, race, class, sexual orientation, 
or national identity as peripheral to the process of interpreting a text or 
carrying on a conversation; rather, the process of pluralistic discourse calls 
on all interpreters to speak a "common language" or to adopt a basic meth- 
odology or to follow "right reason" rather than to introduce "interested 
rhetoric" or provincial concerns (see also Lindsey 1992, pp. 62-65). 
Another literary theorist, Raymond Williams, sounds a warning that should 
be announced before every interreligious dialogue toward a global ethic: 
"A primary means by which privileged groups mask their hegemony is via 
a language of common contribution and co-operative shaping; to the 
extent that such groups can convince all partners in public dialogue that 
each voice contributes equally, to that extent does the conversation deflect 
attention from the unequal distribution of power underlying it" (Williams 
1977, p. 112). 
Here is where the critics press their case. People who advocate interreli- 
gious dialogue and programs for global consensus have not been suffi- 
ciently aware of the "unequal distribution of power" that underlies their 
discourse. So they can be (and have been) co-opted by these structures of 
power. Today we hear much talk about the "global village" in which we all 
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must acknowledge and jointly exercise, in Hans Kiung's terms, "global 
responsibility" based on a global ethic. In this effort, Kiung proclaims the 
demise of Eurocentrism and the coming to be of a "post-colonial," "post- 
capitalist" economy that will be part of the aborning "multi-confessional 
ecumenical world society" (KuAng 1991, pp. 19-20). Unity, peace, coopera- 
tion-these are the possibilities that are now within reach if we would only 
endorse and carry out this program of global discourse! 
Yet here is where, because they are not doing their political-economic 
analysis, Kung and his followers can so easily be swallowed up and used 
by the powers that be. They are not aware, as Surin points out, that the 
Euro-/Western-centric powers of domination have not been dismantled; 
rather, they have been disguised. The stark, horrible inequalities between 
rich and poor, North and South, that continue to produce massive human 
and ecological suffering are still there; indeed, they are increasing rather 
than diminishing. 
Why, in all their glowing language about cooperation and well-being, 
are the proponents of a global dialogue toward a global ethic not talking 
about this? More so, why are they not talking about the political and eco- 
nomic structures that continue to maintain and produce these inequalities? 
We are in not a postcolonial but a neocolonial world. The "new world 
order" is the old world order cleaned up, focused, given a new face 
(Nelson-Pallmeyer 1992). Theologians like Kuing do not seem to recognize 
that "the rise and dominance of the West has been metamorphosed, or 
been 'sublated' into a 'new' project, that of the 'rise and dominance of the 
global'" (Surin 1989, p. 196). The "global" or "new world order" is being 
determined by those with the economic and military power. 
And, because the proponents of global dialogue are not aware of these 
political realities, they can speak, as the global declaration does, "the 
language of the angels" and condemn the horrible evils of racism, poverty, 
sexism, ecological devastation; they can summon all religious believers to 
assume global responsibility and a new world ethic-but they do so with- 
out becoming too specific, without raising the uncomfortable questions 
that would challenge the basic structures of power and the economic 
system (and maybe their own jobs!). Surin is specific in this criticism: 
"European colonialism is condemned, but the neocolonialism into which 
it has been largely transmuted is again not positioned in their discourse. 
Thus David Livingstone and the East India Company will be rightly criti- 
cized, but not the United Fruit Company, or the Union Carbide Corpora- 
tion or the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank" (Surin 1989, 
p. 207). 
So, from the perspective of political analysis and awareness, good-inten- 
tioned theologians, if they are not careful, can become perpetrators or 
pawns of the oppression or mistreatment of others. So how can they be 
careful? 
226 PAUL F. KNITTER 
PROMISE: THE HERMENEUTICAL PRIVILEGE OF VICTIMS 
The first thing that a theologian like Kung or Swidler should do after 
sounding a call for a "global ethic" is to be suspicious of such a call. Again, 
I find little indication of such suspicion in the statements or declarations 
that they have proposed. Such suspicion or awareness is a necessary con- 
dition for being able to protect such projects from the worm of ideology 
that infects all our language, especially when we are making global or uni- 
versal claims. We must be aware that the worm is endemic to our human 
condition; we must, from the start, be checking our proposals for infection. 
In the technical language of contemporary hermeneutics, we must begin, 
and then continue, our project for a global ethic with a strong dose of 
hermeneutical suspicion. We must be constantly vigilant and ready to face 
and ferret out where it is that our truth claims are power claims. 
In confronting such a task, we are helpless by ourselves. Alone, we can- 
not be hermeneutically suspicious. Left to themselves, First World theolo- 
gians like Kung and Swidler (and myself!) cannot carry out the constant 
diagnosis necessary to protect their projects from the worm of ideology. 
Here, precisely here, is where the voices of the oppressed must play a privi- 
leged role in the dialogue toward a global ethic: without their voices, we 
theologians and philosophers of the First World cannot carry out a herme- 
neutical suspicion of our own tradition or of our own contribution to the 
dialogue. By ourselves, we are self-serving selves. We need guides along 
the path to a global ethic. 
Aloysius Pieris, who practices dialogue in the midst of Asia's suffering 
and oppression, tells us who these guides are: "The people who can truly 
purify a religion of communalist ideology are not the theologians or the 
religious hierarchs, but only the conscienticized victims of that ideology" 
(Pieris 1989, pp. 308-309). Only with the help of the oppressed can the 
oppressors truly face their own oppression. 
John O'Brien articulates a growing awareness among Christian theolo- 
gians that a hermeneutical privilege of the oppressed must be accorded a 
"relative normative status" in all theological method. The reason for this 
is not that the poor and the oppressed can claim any kind of a moral supe- 
riority or an exclusive grasp of reality; rather, their privilege is a "thera- 
peutic" one-necessary to diagnose and remedy our ideological distor- 
tions. What O'Brien states about the "method of theology" must, I suggest, 
be affirmed about the "method of interreligious dialogue" to be used in 
the project for a global ethic: "Thus, the hermeneutical privilege of the 
option for the poor in theological method is not an ethical privilege, nor 
even an analytical one in terms of theory or praxis considered in them- 
selves. Its privilege lies in the fact that it is the irreplaceable perspective 
from which theology can critically correct its methodological self-aware- 
ness. In essence, it does this by exercising a therapeutic role, whereby it 
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creates conditions for theologians to come to an awareness of the practi- 
cal roots of their models of discourse" (O'Brien 1992, p. 159; see generally 
pp. 150-161). 
So, in their proposals for a dialogical global ethic, Kung and Swidler can 
and must defend themselves against the co-optation of dialogue by making 
sure that, in all the conversations and deliberations about a global ethic, 
the victims of the world-the poor and suffering and those speaking for 
the suffering earth-will be present and will have a privileged place in the 
conversations. In other words, we must recognize and insist not simply that 
"each voice contribute equally" but that some of us have a more urgent 
and a more helpful word to speak-namely, those who in the past have 
not spoken and who in the present are victims. If dialogue must always be 
par cum parn (equal with equal), there are also those who are primi inter 
pares (first among equals). In assigning a privileged role to the victims, we 
will have to move out from beneath the McDonald's arch (if for no other 
reason than that, in most Third World countries, the poor cannot afford a 
McDonald's hamburger). 
But just what is meant by this hermeneutical privilege or priority for the 
voices of the voiceless? Certainly, I am not suggesting that theirs are the 
only voices to be heard. A central concern for overcoming oppression and 
suffering does not deny, indeed it demands, that our conversations and 
efforts be and remain plural. The voices of the affluent, of the middle class, 
of mystics and artists, must be heard together with the voices of the 
oppressed. Also, the priority and privilege given to victims does not mean 
that their views or claims are simply and always normative. Victims can 
also have distorted interpretations of their reality and dangerous plans to 
remedy it. There are no absolutely privileged seats, no final gavels, around 
the table of dialogue. 
Rather, to assign a privileged place to victims means, I suggest, that no 
conversation can be considered complete or finished unless the voices of 
the suffering have been heard. Also, these voices must be heard, not only 
"first" (as David Tracy 1990 admits), but also "constantly" (Taylor 1990, 
p. 66) and seriously. To take them seriously, to be able really to listen to 
them, we will have to recognize that it will often be difficult to hear and to 
understand them and that we will have to overcome initial reactions of 
mistrust and avoidance. Speaking from his established place in academia, 
David Tracy has recognized this: 
All the victims of our discourses and our history have begun to dis- 
cover their own discourses in ways that our discourse finds difficult 
to hear, much less listen to. Their voices can seem strident and 
uncivil-in a word, other. And they are. We have all begun to sense 
the terror of that otherness. But only by beginning to listen to those 
other voices may we also begin to hear the otherness within our own 
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discourse and within ourselves. What we might then begin to hear 
above our own chatter, are possibilities we have never dared to 
dream. (Tracy 1987, p. 79) 
But, if the suffering and the victimized are truly to exercise a hermeneu- 
tical privilege in our dialogues, it will not be sufficient for those with the 
power simply to listen to them; we will also have to act with and for them. 
Understanding what the suffering are saying, grasping the structures of 
oppression that keep them in bondage and that afflict our planet, is not 
simply a matter of "theory." It can come only from praxis. Our present-day 
world demands that those who engage in dialogue engage in some kind of 
liberative praxis. Without such praxis, we will not be able to "hear" the 
voices of the privileged victims, and our dialogue will be distorted or co- 
opted: "What is demanded ... is an alternative practice, that is, gestures 
and acts of solidarity with movements that wrestle against those unjust 
structures. Such a practice would modify the consciousness of the partici- 
pants and affect the reading of their own religious tradition.... A new 
practice [is] an indispensable dimension of the quest for theological truth" 
(Baum 1991, p. 13). 
Such a "new practice" is also an indispensable dimension for any- 
one engaged in a dialogue toward a global ethic. It is not sufficient to in- 
voke only "the experts." It is not sufficient to call for "working groups of 
scholars" or for a "Global Ethic Research Center," as Kung and Swidler do. 
It is also essential for each First World participant to be engaged, somehow 
and in some degree, in actively listening to, working for, struggling and 
suffering with, those who have been the victims of oppression as they seek 
to understand and transform the political, economic, and cultural structures 
that have dehumanized their life. Without such real-life communicative 
praxis, the proponents of a global ethic will not be able to protect their 
projects from becoming a hidden weapon of domination. 
We must, therefore, continue on this path to a global ethic. But we must 
do so with an acute suspicion of its dangers and in humble listening to 
and cooperation with the victims of injustice. In the words of the Magnif- 
icat, our project for a global ethic can be carried out only if "the mighty 
are put down from their thrones and those of low degree are exalted" 
(Luke 1:52). 
REFERENCES 
Baum, Gregory. 1991. "Radical Pluralism and Liberation Theology." In Radical Plu- 
ralism and Truth: David Tracy and the Hermeneutics of Religion, ed. Werner C. 
Jeanrond and Jennifer L. Rike. New York: Crossroad. 
Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977. Translated by Colin Gordon et al. New York: Pantheon. 
. 1984. "Le souci de la verite." Magazine litteraire, May, p. 18. 
PITFALLS AND PROMISES 229 
Kennedy, Paul. 1993. Preparing for the Twenty-first Century. New York: Random 
House. 
Kiing, Hans. 1991. Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic. New York: 
Crossroad. 
Kuing, Hans, and Karl-Josef Kuschel, eds. 1993. A Global Ethic: The Declaration of 
the Parliament of the World Religions. New York: Continuum. 
Lindsey, William D. 1992. "Public Theology as Civil Discourse: What Are We Talking 
About?" Horizons 19, no. 1:125-147. 
Nelson-Pallmeyer, Jack. 1992. Brave New World Order. Maryknoll: Orbis. 
O'Brien, John. 1992. Theology and the Option for the Poor. Theology and Life Series, 
vol. 22. Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press. 
Pieris, Aloysius. 1989. "Faith Communities and Communalism." East Asian Pastoral 
Review 3-4:294-310. 
Placher, William C. 1989. Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic 
Conversation. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox. 
Rabinow, Paul A. 1984. The Foucault Reader. New York: Pantheon. 
Rooney, Ellen. 1989. Seductive Reasoning: Pluralism as the Problematic of Contem- 
porary Literary Theory. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Surin, Kenneth. 1989. "A 'Politics of Speech': Religious Pluralism in the Age of the 
McDonald's Hamburger." In Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of Reli- 
gious Pluralism, ed. Gavin D'Costa. Maryknoll: Orbis, pp. 192-212. 
Swidler, Leonard. 1992. "Toward a Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic." Pri- 
vately distributed. 
Taylor, Mark Kline. 1990. Remembering Esperanza: A Cultural-Political Theologyfor 
North American Praxis. Maryknoll: Orbis. 
Tracy, David. 1987. Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope. New 
York: Harper & Row. 
. 1990. Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue. Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans. 
Williams, Raymond. 1977. Marxism and Literature. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
